Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 50
Number 2 Spring 2017

Article 4

A Complicated Alchemy: Theorizing Identity
Politics and the Politicization of Migrant
Remittances Under Donald Trump's Presidency
Stephen Wilks
Valparaiso University Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Law and
Politics Commons
Recommended Citation
Wilks, Stephen (2017) "A Complicated Alchemy: Theorizing Identity Politics and the Politicization of Migrant Remittances Under
Donald Trump's Presidency," Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 50 : No. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol50/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell International Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information,
please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

A Complicated Alchemy: Theorizing
Identity Politics and the Politicization
of Migrant Remittances Under
Donald Trump's Presidency
Stephen Wilkst
Introduction .....................................................
I. An Overview of Remittances in Global and Domestic
Contexts Through the Lenses of Regulation and Theory ..
II. Mapping the Recent History of Politicizing Remittance
Practices .................................................
III. The Economic Interplay Between Globalization, Migration,
White Identity Politics, and Race as Co-Determinants of
Antipathy Towards Remittance Users .....................
IV. Locating Migrant Remittances Within Payment System
Taxonomy ................................................
C onclusion ......................................................

285
287
29 1

295
302
305

Introduction
On April 5, 2016, The Washington Post reported receiving a memo
from then-Republican-nomination-candidate Donald Trump that outlined a
strategy to force Mexico to build a wall along its border with the United
States. The memo proposed threatening to cut off remittance flows to Mexico if that country did not make a "one-time payment of $5-10 billion" to
contribute to the cost of the wall.' More specifically, Trump called for
amendments to existing "know-your-client" rules that would prohibit outbound international wire transfers originating from the United States
unless sending parties furnished proof of their lawful presence inside the
country. 2 This Article examines both the historical politicization of
migrant remittances and Trump's proposal as an attempt to extend this
politicization into political arenas where there are persistent anxieties surrounding globalization's impact on white working class identity. I argue
T Associate Professor, Valparaiso University Law School, B.A., LL.B., Queen's
University at Kingston (Canada); M.S.W., University of Toronto; and LL.M., Ph.D., York
University, Osgoode Hall Law School (Canada).
1. Bob Woodward & Robert Costa, Trump Reveals How He Would Force Mexico to
Pay for Border Wall, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/poli
tics/trump-wouldseek-to-block-money-transfers-to-force-mexico-to-fund-border-wall/201
6/04/05/c0196314-fa7c-lle5-80e4-c381214dela3_story.htrnl [https://perma.cc/2QM
B-BF83].
2. Id.; see 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.120-121.
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that such political calculations present the potential to reconstruct migrant
remittance usage as symbolic of a perceived theft of prosperity in the eyes
of white working class Americans who have grown wary of their declining
economic position in both domestic and global terms. I also make the
claim that the antipathy towards remittance customers has the potential to
create a taxonomy of typologies that lay along a continuum that ranges in
degrees of societal standing from typical payment practices housed within
mainstream depository services to migrant remittances.
This is a discussion about an aspect of globalization's consequencesa set of transnational, interactive and integrative processes between and
among public and private actors. While such processes have largely
revolved around international trade, information technology aided these
processes as well. There is no denying globalization's adverse effects on
the working class in developed countries or its role in the movement of
migrants who remain dependent on the technological infrastructure supporting their capacity to send money home. Because both constituencies
are casualties of a transnational set of economic forces, the notion that
remittance use might serve as a point of politicized conflict between them
is proof that the legal structures surrounding global remittance networks
have transcended their commercial functions to emerge as important
organs of international statecraft. Social, political, cultural, and economic
forces continue to infuse this architecture with meanings that are not simply transactional. Implicit in this recognition is an assumption that remittance scholarship should expand its scope beyond matters such as tracing
taxable income, money laundering, or the financing of terrorism. Indeed,
qualitatively different influences continue to shape societal perceptions of
remittance use services in sending countries, their receiving country
dependents, and the implications for those economies relying on these
flows of privatized aid into the developing world. Trump's proposal offers
an opportunity for scholarly inquiry into a particular combination of these
perceptions, one which exploits a view of globalization's concurrent effects
on the international movement of migrant labor across America's borders
and on her shrinking white working class; it reconstitutes remittance structures as a globalist vehicle used to divert prosperity away from American
workers; and it purports to reassert American territorial sovereignty in
ways that represent a misdirected Westphalian response to a global political economy increasingly networked in its structure and function. This last
point is of critical importance, given the nature of modern payment environments, which I have previously described as networked ecologies-a
theoretical approach that recognizes structural relationships between
actors that transcend traditional or organizational hierarchies and investigates the ways these actors exert their influence on each other. 3 AnneMarie Slaughter and David Zaring characterize networks as "linking actors
across national boundaries and carrying on various aspects of global gov3. See Stephen Wilks, The Governance Ecology of Electronic Food Stamp Delivery:
Time for a New Praxis?, 30 I-Lv J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 311, 313-14 (2014).
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ernance in new and informal ways." 4 In their view, a networked world
necessafunctions above, below, and through states, and a state's influence
5
rily depends on its capacity to form effective connections.
This Article is outlined as follows: Part I provides an overview of
American remittance regulation, examines data on migrant flows, discusses a cross-disciplinary survey of relevant remittance scholarship, and
highlights the networked nature of remittance activity as a whole. Part II
offers a comparative discussion of remittance scholarship written in the
wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This comparison aims
to draw parallels between current and previous political climates in which
remittance ecologies were viewed with suspicion. Though qualitatively distinct, each of the two contexts shares important commonalities rooted in
collective angst about the collision of globalization and human mobility.
Part III considers aspects of this collision as further shaped by white identity politics. It also considers the role of these politics in conservative attitudes towards migrant remittances, which mainly cater to people of color,
many of whom, as Jose Gabilondo once wrote, have entered into "partial
statelessness in order to work."'6 Part IV discusses how the intersectionality of race, immigration, socio-economic class, globalization and American
identity has produced a taxonomy of payment environments. This taxonomy serves as a set of value-laden pathways to economic participation that
may be understood in both domestic and global contexts. I also argue that
this offers a useful way of demonstrating how the treatment of remittance
users serves to reinforce their marginalized standing within payment
ecologies.
I.

An Overview of Remittances in Global and Domestic Contexts
Through the Lenses of Regulation and Theory

This Article focuses on a particular subset of migrant remittance services, namely those wire transfer services operating outside conventional
depository banks. 7 Migrant remittances are recurring transfers of cash
4. Anne-Marie Slaughter and David Zaring, Networking Goes International: An
Update, 2 ANN. REV. L. Soc. Sci. 211, 215 (2006).

5. Id.
6. Jose Gabilondo, Monetizing Diaspora:Liquid Sovereigns and the Interest Convergence Around Worker Remittances, 26 PA. ST. INT'L L. REV. 653, 671 (2008).
7. This Article defines "migrants" as people and populations who tend to move
from one place to another in order to work on a seasonal basis. International migrants
work in foreign countries. In ordinary parlance, migrants are distinguishable from
"immigrants" who are people not living in their birth country. Whereas migrants tend
to live more nomadically, immigrants are thought to settle in their adoptive country on a
permanent or long-term basis. What is Migration?, THE LAW DICTIONARY (last visited

Mar. 22, 2017), http://thelawdictionary.org/migration Ihttps://perma.cc/EK9Z-Q6ZQ];
What is Immigrant?, THE LAW DICTIONARY (last visited Mar. 22, 2017), http://thelawdic-

tionary.org/immigrant/ [https://perma.cc/QK6G-WG8H]. These simplistic distinctions
are provided for ease of reference and do not easily capture the degree to which populations may alternate between the classifications of migrant and immigrant.
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sent by foreign workers to home country recipients. 8 Migrant remittance
flows typically move from developed countries into the developing world,
which has prompted considerable debate about the interplay between
migration and economic development due in part to the aggregate volumes
of cash moving through remittance corridors. 9 According to the Population Reference Bureau, 214 million people were international migrants in
2010-roughly three percent of the global population. 10 The World Bank
reports that global remittances for the year 2013 totaled $531 billion, of
which more than 75.3% went to developing countries." The same source
also forecasts that these flows will reach nearly $636 billion by 2016, with
74.8% of this amount going to developing countries. Dollar flows commonly terminate in the Middle East, the Indian Ocean Region, Asia, South12
east Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean.
American-based migrant remittance operators are known as Money
Services Businesses (MSBs). 13 Western Union and MoneyGram are among
the world's largest MSBs, offering wire transfer services at grocery stores,
stand-alone check-chasing businesses, and other retail businesses. 1 4 These
entities offer a range of financial services in addition to remittances, such
as currency exchange, check cashing, and the sale or redemption of prepaid credit and other store value cards.' 5 Under the aegis of the Uniform
Money Services Act, states administer the registration and licensing
regimes for MSBs, banks, credit unions, and other financial actors and sup8. Thomas Straubhaar & Florin P. V.dean, International Migrant Remittances and
their Role in Development, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OUTLOOK: SOPEMI 2006 140-41

(OECD ed., 2006).
9. Id.
10. The Population Reference Bureau (PRB) is a nonprofit organization that gathers
and analyzes statistical data across several fields, including economic development,
health, migration, and environmental science. See POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, http:/
/www.prb.org/ [https://perma.cc/Q73E-MAM8] (last visited July 27, 2017).
11. See Remittance Prices Worldwide: Making Markets More Transparent, THE WORLD
BANK (last updated June 14, 2017), http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/ [https://per
ma.cc/WG2Q-F3JK] [hereinafter Remittance Prices]. Income generated by Western
Union-the world's largest provider of remittance services-places fee profitability in its
commercial context. The firm's transactions fees exceeded $3.9 billion in 2015. See
WESTERN UNION, NOTICE OF 2016 ANNUAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS, PROXY STATEMENT
& 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 15 (2015).

12. Nikos Passas, Fighting Terror with Error: The Counter-Productive Regulation of
Informal Value Transfers, 45 CRIME, L. & Soc. CHANGE 315, 325 (2006).
13. Money Services Business (MSB) Information Center, IRS (last updated Feb. 10,
2017), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/money-servicesbusiness-msb-information-center [https://perma.cc/ANK4-YRS3].
14. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, New Rules for Money Transfers, but Few Limits, N.Y.
TIMES (June 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/02/business/new-rules-formoney-transfers-but-few-limits.html [https://perma.cc/5KHV-JLJZ].
15. As of March 31, 2016, there were 456 state licensed money transmitters in the
United States, with 243 operating in more than one state. See CONT. OF ST. BANK SUPERVISORS & MONEY TRANSMITTER REGULATORS ASs'N, THE STATE OF STATE MONEY SERVICES BUSIREGULATION & SUPERVISION 6 (May 2016), https://www.csbs.org/regulatory/
Cooperative-Agreements/Documents/State%20of%2State%20MSB%20Regulation%20
and%20Supervision%202.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DEU-7MRY].
NESSES
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port their stable operation within modem payment. 16 Federal law complements these regimes, imposing absolute liability for noncompliance with
state licensing requirements. 17 Federal regulations also prohibit the unlicensed operation of MSBs,' 8 and require operators to register with, and
report to, both the U.S. Treasury Department and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The U.S. Treasury's reporting rules are
found under Title 31 of the United States Code. 19 MSB operators must
also furnish proof that they have policies and procedures in place to ensure
compliance, including required Financial Crime Enforcement Network
(FinCEN) registration and documentation of a BSA/AML compliance program-including so-called Know-Your-Client ("KYC") provisions requiring
that customers furnish proof of their identities before completing transactions. 20 Trump's proposal would fundamentally transform the current
structure of KYC rules by extending their financial reporting functions into
the realm of immigration enforcement. The implications of such a proposal are best understood in the context of available data tracking the movement of migrants and their remittance flows as well as existing scholarship
highlighting network ecologies in which themes of development, migration, and remittances interact.
Against the backdrop of these regulations, considerable sums of
money flow through remittance corridors between the United States and
Latin America. Remittance flows to Latin America are expected to reach
$70 billion in 2016 and $73 billion in 2017.21 In 2015, Mexico was the
fourth largest remittance receiving country, with inbound flows reaching
$25.7 billion. 22 The majority of that sum-$25 billion-moved through the
U.S.-Mexico corridor. 23 This corresponds with data showing that the
northbound flow of migrants from Mexico into the United States repre24
sents one of the top ten migration corridors worldwide.
Trump's proposal to disrupt these flows invites speculation about the
benefit of migrant remittances as development alternatives to Bretton
Woods programs, foreign direct investment, initiatives originating within
civil society, and organic or "home grown" economic development. For
example, the conditionality requirements forming part of structural adjustment programs typically force debtor-country governments to deviate from
their electorates' expectations in order to obtain much financing. The pattern of such incursions into state sovereignty reflect a tendency towards
16. UNIF. MO'EY SERV. ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2001).

17. 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(A) (2012).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (2012).
19. 31 U.S.C. § 5330 (2012).
20. 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.120-21.
21. Remittance Prices, supra note 11.
22. WORLD BANK GROUP, MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES FACTBOOK 2016 29 (3d ed.
2016), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/3349341199807908806/4549025-1450455807487/Factbookpartl .pdf [https://perma.cc/
WC4H-8TRQ].
23. Id. at 33.
24. Id. at 21.
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forcing borrowing states to privatize assets and services historically within
the domain of government, such as the provision of telecommunication,
public utilities, public transit, or the operation of airports. Sometimes, as
was the case in Haiti during the 1990s, demands to privatize are bolstered
by threats to disrupt economic aid.2 5 Such institutional hegemony does
not merely signal a preference for capitalist approaches to managing public
assets. It replaces domestic governance choices with external ones, contemplating a smaller role for the states so as to make way for practices
commonly associated with private sector actors. 26 Other development
strategies, such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and NGO-sponsored
programs, offer significant benefits insofar as they support the creation of
relatively good paying jobs in developing economies. 2 7 Yet, the migration
data would suggest FDI produces wages gains that are unevenly distributed
across the developing world and remain modest in comparison to the earnings potential available in developed countries.
The preference for exporting labor in exchange for the inbound-remittance flows appeals to countries whose migrant workers are more economically productive abroad than at home. In this context, there is a greater
emphasis on maintaining bonds between diaspora workers and their home
countries, effectively institutionalizing remittance corridors. Alejandro
Portes has critiqued out-migration and inbound remittance flows as both
the cause and symptoms of underdevelopment. 2 8 He argues that outmigration depopulates labor-exporting countries, weakens economic productivity in poorer countries, and preserves the position of local power
elites without changing structural problems that continue to undermine
development. 2 9 Yet, what should scholars make of this transnationalization of migrants insofar as it has produced a network of civil society
groups, such as hometown associations and ethno-specific professional
groups and charities, that facilitate an "intense traffic of communication,
information and resources" between origin and host countries? 30 Portes
suggests such groups are composed of well-established migrants who may
distinguish themselves from recent arrivals. 3 1 Moreover, many of these
25. Mark Baker, PrivatizationIn The Developing World: Panaceafor the Economic Ills
of the Third World or PrescriptionOverused? 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMe. L. 233, 234
(1999); see also Gabilondo, supra note 6, at 657.
26. Baker, supra note 25, at 237.
27. Foreign direct investment generally describes the process whereby an individual
or corporate actor in one country makes investments in another, either by the forming of
a new enterprise or the acquisition of an existing business. For a discussion of the
relationships between international migration and foreign direct investment, see Matthew Sanderson & Jeffrey Kenton, Globalization Development and International Migration: A Cross-NationalAnalysis of Less-Developed Countries, 1970-2000 88 Soc. FORCES

301 (2009).
28. Alejandro Portes, Migration and Development: Reconciling Opposite Views, 32 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 5, 5-22 (2009).

29. Id. at 6.
30. Steven Vertovec, Migrant Transnationalismand Modes of Transformation, 38 INT'L
MIGRATION REV. 970, 970-1001 (2004).
31. Portes, supra note 28, at 9; see also Alejandro Portes et al., Immigrant Transnational Organizations and Development: A Comparative Study, 41 INT'L MIGRATION REv.
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civil society groups have limited capacity to execute what Portes calls
"globalization from below," that is, efforts to offset inequities produced by
globalization. 3 2 Remittance literature suggests migrant resources are not
only modest, but also tend to decline as subsequent generations become
oriented toward life in their new country. 33 Additionally, benefits of transnationalization will remain limited as long as poor countries suffer losses
of human capital and, by extension, an erosion of economic infrastructure.
These writings respond to the popular appeal underlying Trump's proposal by presenting a mix of competing narratives, illustrating diverse
views of remittance users, their motivations, and their impact on political
economy. As a body of work that implicitly recognizes the highly
networked nature of transnational migration and remittance flows, this
scholarship also tells the story of the increased human and capital mobility
allowing developing countries to use globalization as a kind of lung-exhaling human labor to higher-waged economies and ingesting their diasporas'
wages despite the societal effects on their nationals in sending countries.
Much of this discourse warrants attention to the American context,
because the United States is a sending country whose economy is experiencing tepid recovery as it wrestles with debates about the presence and
impact of undocumented immigrants within its borders. There is no denying the political calculus implicit in linking remittance practices to policy
disputes about illegal immigration and the diminished position of
America's working class. It reflects a strategy of reconstructing remittance
flows as a touchstone for channeling anxieties about globalization's
adverse effects without meaningful distinction between their real versus
perceived effects on relevant segments of the U.S. workforce.
II.

Mapping the Recent History of Politicizing Remittance Practices

Politicized linkages between remittances, diaspora populations, and
perceived threats to American interests are not new. Following the terror
attacks on September 11, 2001, transnational remittance flows were subject to intense scrutiny because of reports that the attacks were financed
34
with funds sent to U.S. banks using a series of low-dollar wire transfers.
Despite the absence of evidence connecting them to the attacks, informal
remittance corridors between the United States and the Indian Ocean
242, 242-81 (2007); Alejandro Portes et al., Transnational Entrepreneurs:An Alternative
Form of Immigrant Adaptation, 67 AM. Soc. REV. 278, 278-98 (2002).
32. Portes, supra note 28, at 10; see also ROBERT C. SMITH, MExcAN NEw Yom<: TRANSNATIONAL WORLDS OF NEw IMMIGRANTS (2005); Jose Itzigsohn et al., Mapping Dominican
Transnationalism:Narrow and Broad Transnational Practices, 22 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD.

316, 335-39 (1999); Patricia Landolt, Salvadoran Economic Transnationalism:Embedded
Strategies for Household Maintenance, Immigrant Incorporation, and Entrepreneurial
Expansion, 1 GLOBAL NETWORKS 217, 229-30 (2001).
33. Portes, supra note 28, at 11; see also William Haller & Patricia Landolt, The
Transnational Dimensions of Identity Formation: Adult Children of Immigrants in Miami,
28 ETHNIC &

RACIAL STUD.

1182, 1199-1205 (2005).

34. Passas, supra note 12, at 332-35.

Cornell International Law Journal

Vol. 50

region were subject to intense regulatory scrutiny. 35 A prototypical informal remittance transaction might unfold as follows: A man in New York, A,
wants to send money to a relative, B, in a remote part of Pakistan. He will
take the money to a local hawaladar, Ha, who will arrange for his counterpart, Hb, in Pakistan to have the money available for collection by B. These
arrangements might include a password or some other means of properly
identifying B as the intended recipient of the money. A then contacts B and
provides the password or identifying information. B takes this code to his
or her local hawaladar, Hb, and is paid accordingly. At this point in the
scenario, Ha in New York now has a debt to Hb in Pakistan, who paid B on
his behalf. The two agents will now find a way to "settle" what is now a
debt owed to Hb. There are several ways to do this. The two agents may
have clearance accounts, which they use to clear debts on a monthly or
bimonthly basis. Alternatively, Ha and Hb may set up a reverse transaction
to remit funds in the opposite direction. A more indirect type of reverse
transaction would see Ha pay for specific things in New York, such as
school tuition, for people in Pakistan who have already provided these
funds to Hb as their local hawaladar. (In this example, Ha's tuition payment will discharge some or all of the debt owing to Hb. However, such
reverse transactions are not always feasible because remittance flows tend
to be uneven.) If the two transfer agents have import/export businesses,
they may agree to over/under invoice in connection with a sale of goods.
(This can also involve trade through a third country.) Predictably, there
are always imbalances within informal remittance activities. In the scenario
provided above, transfer agents Ha and Hb could "sell" their respective
positions to high-level or "wholesale" hawaladars who consolidate these
assets and liabilities.3 6 These wholesalers usually have commercial
account facilities and arrangements with formal banks that allow the over37
seas transmission of funds in U.S. currency, albeit illegally.
As with remittance flows into Latin America, complex social, cultural,
and developmental issues informed participant behavior from the divergent perspectives of remittance users and their sending country societies.
Informal remittance systems have a long history. Nikos Passas has coined
the phrase "informal value transfer system" (IVTS) to describe these networks, which provide a means of transferring money or other assets
through the exchange of debt without leaving a paper trail. 38 He defines
an IVTS as "any network or mechanism that can be used to transfer funds
or value from place to place either without leaving a formal paper trail of
the entire transaction or without going through regulated financial institu35. Id.
36. This is an important distinction from low-level or "retail" transfer agents who
handle street-level transactions.
37. Two (sometimes overlapping) groups have sought to capitalize on the asymmetrical flow of international remittances: (a) a small group of wealthy elites living in poor
countries; and (b) import/export businesses operating in currency-controlled economies. These two groups have the resources to use hawala at the highest levels in order to
circumvent currency controls and buy securities or other assets anywhere in the world.
38. Passas, supra note 12, at 327.
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tions." 3 9 IVTS systems operate similarly across different regions and cultures. Hawala-Arabic for "transfer"-is the largest of such networks, with
roots in the Indian subcontinent that developed with immigration. Similar
networks are called hundi in parts of40South Asia, fei ch'ien or quanxi in
China, and padala in the Philippines.
These financial transactions have been variously described as "underground" or "alternative" banking. Rather than being hidden, they operate
within existing legitimate businesses-such as travel agencies, grocery
stores, or Internet cafes-particularly in immigrant neighborhoods. 4 1 Even
without licenses or registration, informal remitters can place their money
in correspondent accounts with major financial institutions as part of settlement transactions with their overseas counterparts. 4 2 Some writers challenge the use of terms like "banking," "money-lending," or "informal,"
preferring to describe IVTS systems as a "network of reciprocities" to trans43
fer value between two or more locations on behalf of clients. Informality
networks. 44
reciprocal
these
build
to
thus relates to the participants' ability
In some parts of the world, informal remittance networks are not considered alternative systems because they are often the only kind of financial
infrastructure in many regions where economic or political instability cannot support formal, Westem-style banking. Formal and informal remittance services provide a narrower range of services compared to offerings
available at conventional banks. 4 5 Their role is strictly to facilitate remittances, and they are considered formal or informal based on their compliance with MSB regulations described above. 4 6 Avner Greifs remarks about
intra-cultural self-regulation parallel the work of Schramme and Taube,
who analyze hawala's transactional and cultural structures from an anthropological perspective. For example, Greif explains how shared religious
and cultural identities create "club" dynamics that stress the importance of
reputation and exclusivity, effectively keeping these networked clubs
small.4 7 By contrast, Schramm and Taube suggest modem, market-oriented regulatory structures cannot offer comparable consumer protections,
particularly given the nature of many remittance transactions, that cross
international boundaries. 48 Like Passas, they question the expensive, cumbersome, and time-consuming pursuit of regulatory remedies that act as a
39. Id. at 317.
40. Id.
41. Nikos Passas, Informal Value Transfer Systems, Terrorism and Money Laundering:
A Report to the National Institute of Justice, US DEP'T JUST. 1, 8, 16 (2005).
42. Id. at 28.
43. Roger Ballard, Coalitions of Reciprocity and The Maintenance of FinancialIntegrity
Within Informal Value Transmission Systems: The OperationalDynamics of Contemporary
Hawala Networks, 6 J. BANIONG REG. 319, 326 (2005).
44. Id. at 336.
45. Passas, supra note 41, at 14.
46. See 18 U.S.C. § 1960.
47. Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the
Maghrebi Traders, 49 J. EcON. HIST. 857, 878 (1989) [hereinafter Greif, Reputation].
48. Matthias Schramm & Markus Taube, Evolution and InstitutionalFoundationof the
Hawala FinancialSystem. 12 INT'L REV. FIN. ANA.ixYsis 405, 410 (2003).
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poor substitute for intra-cultural, intra-religious customs, which strongly
discourage potential compliance problems and safeguard transactions.
Anthropologists and economic historians have identified similar cultural patterns. In his 2005 systematic review of IVTS networks, Ballard
observes: "None of these networks sprang into existence out of the blue:
each was grounded in a specific group of migrants' ancestral values and
traditions, and in the modes of exchange and value transfer, which usually
had lengthy historical roots."49 Ballard was among the early writers who
questioned the wisdom of displacing ancient commercial traditions with
banking regulations that favor the modern industrial financial system.
Like Passas, he has also conducted fieldwork into the cultural and mechanical intricacies of IVTS networks. Ballard argues their success lies in the
capacity to build coalitions founded on interpersonal trust.50 These coalitions form organically over time, engendering trust and compliance by
wrapping family, social, cultural, and religious affiliations around important business relationships. Reputation is highly prized so as to effectively
51
discourage dishonesty.
Herein lie the conflicting treatments of payment platforms, as agents
of state regulation or as spaces blending culture, commerce, development,
and shared identity. In using the concept of a coalition, Ballard makes a
particular statement about the shared interests of those functioning within
these ancient networks. Like Ballard and Passas, Avner Greif, who wrote
about intra-cultural dynamics among traders in Africa's Maghribi region
during the eleventh century, identifies shared ethno-religious origins as
forming a natural basis on which to build a "coahtion" and to circulate
information about a trader's performance history. 52 The nature of these
interactions among traders within the coalition was such that they reinforced group social structures, firmly embedding business relationships
within a broader ethno-cultural value system. 5 3
Just as a strand of current political discourse has sought to create the
appearance of a causal nexus between remittance users and America's current economic anxieties, so too did the post-9/11 counter-terrorist narrative nurture a particular view of remittance flows into countries with large
or majority Muslim populations, infusing them with paranoia about people
resorting to these transactions and their suspected motives. Both were situations in which information, or the lack of it, became synonymous with
categorizing remittance users as risky. Western regulators saw the potential for such risk whenever legal or natural persons can undetectably move
through networked spaces. Amoore and de Goede specifically mention the
use of informal remittances as a barrier to achieving data surveillance pre49. Ballard, supra note 43, at 325.
50. Id. at 344.
51. Id. at 328.
52. See Greif, Reputation, supra note 47, at 882; see also Avner Greif, Contract
Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition,
83 AM. ECON. REv. 525, 526 (1993).

53. Id.
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cisely because they generate no footprint. 54 They argue that people who
live within a surveillance society without generating any technological profile offer examples of the potential for misidentification, given the presumptions made about people who do not use bank accounts, credit cards,
or other commercial technologies that function in the modern economy as
trust affirming mechanisms. Contrast this approach with that of Emmanuel Yujuico, who notes the consumer attraction to anonymity (beyond our
general desire for privacy), which provides relative immunity from corrupt,
rent-seeking behaviors that target remittance flows and helps migrants
55
lacking documentation escape detection from immigration authorities.
The seemingly different treatments of migrant remittances share
important themes in common. They reflect a dystopian worldview in
which dangers lie beyond U.S. borders-dangers which must remain carefully managed to exclude outsiders deemed a threat both to America's way
of life and to her standing as a global superpower. Be they Muslims
unfairly associated with religious extremism or immigrant Latinos whose
population includes a subset of undocumented laborers being blamed in
part for the plight of America's working class, racial, religious, and cultural
invectives are now part of the payment landscape as expressed by existing
laws, by proposed changes to those laws, and by a growing portion of the
conservative American populous.
III.

The Economic Interplay Between Globalization, Migration, White
Identity Politics, and Race as Co-Determinants of Antipathy
Towards Remittance Users

Migrant remittances have become a point of cross-cultural contact
between two discrete demographic groups who have become globalization's casualties in albeit different ways. The increased technological
capacity to quickly move people and capital across great distances and the
outsourcing of manufacturing jobs that has decimated the American economy are firmly rooted in globalization. Yet, these shifts have been especially harsh on the working class in developed countries like the United
States, where white males with no post-secondary education have been
56
The resulting misexcluded from the latest signs of economic growth.
match between the longstanding mantra of securing socioeconomic mobility with persistent hard work and the current earnings trends have led to a
crisis of confidence in the ability of traditional political institutions to
54. Louise Amoore & Marieke de Goede, Transactions after 9/11: The Banal Face of
the Preemptive Strike, 33 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 173, 181 (2008).

55. Emmanuel Yujuico, All Modes Lead to Home: Assessing the State of the Remittance
Art, 9 GLOBAL NETwoRKs 63, 72 (2009).

56. The Weaker Sex, THE ECONOMIST (May 30, 2015), http://www.economist.com/
news/leaders/21652323-blue-collar-men-rich-countries-are-trouble-they-must-learnadapt-weaker-sex [https://perma.cc/AW2A-P9MN] [hereinafter The Weaker Sex]; see also
Victor Tan Chen, All Hollowed Out, THE ATLANTIC Uan. 16, 2016), http://www.theatlantic
.com/business/archive/2016/01/white-working-class-poverty/424341/?utmsource=at
lfb [https://perma.cc/ZKR5-YBG3].
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serve the broader public good.5 7 Much of that frustration has been trained
on illegal immigrants who symbolize stolen prosperity and dependency on
a social welfare state viewed as unable to care for marginalized Americans.5 8 Recent data places these attitudes in statistical context.
Between July 8, 2015 and August 31, 2016, Gallup surveyed 112,995
American adults about their views of Donald Trump. 59 The findings
revealed that Republicans who favored Trump were more likely than other
Republicans to oppose free trade and immigration;60 more likely to feel
economically insecure; 6 1 more likely to be white, heterosexual, non-Hispanic males; 62 and were less likely to have attained post-secondary education. 63 The survey also found that blue-collar workers-particularly those
whose jobs were exposed to the effects of trade competition-were far more
likely to support Trump. 6 4 Significantly, respondents living in zip codes
with disproportionately white residents were also much more likely to support Trump. 65 These respondents' pessimistic outlook is juxtaposed
against an economy where median incomes climbed in 2015, and where
the unemployment rate has plummeted from 9.9 percent in March 2010 to
4.9 in September 2016. Yet, recent Census Bureau data also establishes the
following: minorities dominated the country's earnings growth, posting the
greatest rises among Hispanics in 2015;66 there was a seventy percent
increase in the proportion of immigrants living in the United States
between 1994 and 2014;67 and the estimated number of unauthorized
immigrants roughly doubled from 5.7 million to 11.1 million in a ten-year
period ending in 2014.68 Throughout much of the same period, American
men with a high school education saw their pay drop by twenty-one
percent. 69
57. Jonathan T. Rothwell, Explaining nationalist political views: The case of Donald
Trump, Unpublished Manuscript, 1, 9 http://pelg.ucsd.edu/2.rothweHl2016.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/KT4GFWHD] (last visited Mar. 2, 2017).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 11.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 12.
65. Id. at 13.
66. Bernadette D. Proctor et al., Income and Poverty in the United States: 2015, Current PopulationReports, U.S. Census Bureau 5 (2016). https://www.census.gov/content/
dam/Census/library/publications/2016/demo/p60-256.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R7MH8PVB]; Valerie Wilson, New Census Data Show Strong 2015 Earnings Growth Across the
Board, with Black and Hispanic Workers Seeing the Fastest Growth, THE ECON. POL'Y INST.
(Sept. 13, 2016), http://www.epi.org/blog/new-census-data-show-strong-2015-eamingsgrowth-across-the-board-with-black-and-hispanic-workers-seeing-the-fastest-growth/
[http://perma.cc/JHH6-VXT5].
67. The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration, NAT'L AcADs. Sci., ENGINEERING & MED. (Francine D. Blau & Christopher Mackie eds., 2016), https://www.nap
.edu/read/23550/chapter/1 [https://perma.cc/Q7DF-8AA6].
68. Id.
69. The Weaker Sex, supra note 56.
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It is tempting to blame globalization for much of the current tension
arising from the collision of race, class, and identity politics in American
life. However, these tensions are as old as the country's labor movement
itself, which has played a central role in the formation of white working
class identity and the expectations of its intended beneficiaries. The socialist consciousness endorsed by labor groups formed during the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, such as The Knights of Labor and The Industrial Workers of the World, consciously took aim at the ways in which capitalism exploited gender and race. The American Federation of Labor
(AFL), whose leadership embraced the more protectionist notion of job consciousness, eventually eclipsed these organizations. Job consciousness was
a "protectionist ideology that [lent] itself to exclusionary practices and
[did] not seek to challenge the basic structure of production."70 This philosophical shift combined with an organizational emphasis on craft unionism that gave pride of place to white males on the shop floor to effectively
marginalize women and people of color within the labor movement. This
protectionism also operated in various ways to entrench white male privilege. Craft unions controlled who was hired and which workers would
have access to skilled jobs. As the AFL became more influential, it formalized practices of racial exclusion as foundational to the development white
working class solidarity. In her book chronicling Seattle's 1920s labor
movement, Dana Frank describes how the AFL's unions organized boycotts
of businesses either owned by Japanese Immigrants or by whites willing to
hire Japanese workers. 7 1 Given their capacity to make consumer choices
on behalf of their households, white women were also encouraged to participate in racial exclusion by limiting their patronage to businesses hiring
only white workers. 72 This job consciousness would eventually morph
into business unionism, born of the 1955 merger between the AFL and the
C1O. 7 3 As with its predecessor, business unionism was mainly concerned
with securing for its unionized members a maximal share of the prosperity
they helped to create. The rise of business unionism eventually coincided
with the ascendancy of various social justice movements. 74 The identity
politics of race, gender, LGBTQ, the disabled, and environmentalism were
eventually juxtaposed with a labor movement whose primary beneficiaries
were white men. Although social justice movements and organized labor
did not part ways forever, globalization could not have made the reunion
easy. For example, the working conditions endured by undocumented
workers only emerged as a matter of strategic import to the AFL after a
sharp drop in unionization gradually led to the end of its hostile stance
70. Marion Cram & Ken Mathey, Labor's Identity Crisis, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1767, 1775
(2001).
71. DANA FRANK, PURCHASING POWER: CONSUMER ORGANIZING, GENDER, AND THE SEATTLE LABOR MOVEMENT 1919-1929 6-7 (1994).

72. Id.
73. Id. at 251.
74. Austin McCoy, Bringing The Social Back: Rethinking The Declension Narrative of
Twentieth-Century US Labour History, 41 Soc. HisT. 1, 9-10 (2016).
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toward illegal aliens as a collective threat to its workers. 75 This brief history should remind readers that organized labor has not been blameless in
nurturing the expectations of its workers in ways that were not always
responsive to claims for equity. Although their position within the global
economy may have severely diminished, the legacy of expectations they
inculcated among subsets of their dispossessed membership remains
firmly intact and unmet.
In a global economy where falling trade barriers and a demand for
technologically skilled jobs have eviscerated manufacturing jobs, these
workers face limited choices, which typically include competing for the
low-skilled jobs that are traditionally the domain of adolescents and a
swath of newly-arrived immigrants willing to do unskilled work. Yet, it is
impossible to discuss this particular confluence of migration, immigration,
mobility, and employment without discussing race and white identity politics. White identity politics matter not simply because of racism, but
because of race's centrality as a variable allocating privilege and expectations among those used to occupying a particular place within America's
political economy.
This Article defines identity politics as those forces prompting people
or organizations to coalesce around a set of shared themes, usually producing an organizing process that shapes the discourse about experiences
common to a group's constituents. 76 Such patterns often occur as part of a
dialectic in which an occurrence or state of affairs has spurred those
affected to respond while recognizing a set of intra-group norms. Jim Crow
era laws, prohibition of women's right to vote, heterosexism, and environmental harm have each spawned large-scale movements seeking social
change while at the same time eliciting intense opposition. Each of these
contests, in turn, has refined the identity politics of their respective participants in an evolutionary process that can revise interpretations of the very
themes around which people and organizations initially coalesced. I do
not share the view of identity politics scholars whose unifying themes are
commonly formed around what Jessica Knouse calls anatomical or quasianatomical attributes. 7 7 Anatomical attributes are features such as the
color of one's skin or gender, whereas quasi-anatomical attributes refer to
concepts such as sexual orientation or certain kinds of disabilities not
apparent through physical examination. 78 By contrast, theorists place the
75. Michael Kazin, How Labor Learned to Love Immigration, NEW REPUBLIC (May 13,
2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/113203/labor-and-immigration-how-unionsgot-board-immigration-reform [https://perma.cc/MJA2-ZWCT].
76. This theory's precise origins remain a matter of debate. See Renee Anspach,
From Stigma to Identity Politics: PoliticalActivism Among the Physically Disabled and Former Mental Patients, 13A Soc. Sci. & MED.: MED. PSYCH. & MED. Soc. 765, 765-67
(1979); Mary Bernstein, Identity Politics, 31 ANN. REV. Soc. 47, 47-52 (2005); Combahee
River Collective Statement, April 1977 in HOME GIRLS: A BLACK FEMINIST ANTHOLOGY
272-82 (Barbara Smith ed., 1983); and Duchess Harris, All of Who I Am in the Same
Place: The Combahee River Collective, in 2 WOMANIST THEORY & RES. (1999).
77. Jessica Knouse, From Identity Politics to Ideology Politics, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 749,
752 (2009).
78. Id. at 753.
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politics of social class outside the framework of identity politics, which
examines the status-based relationships between experience, culture, identity, politics, and power, 79 and takes up questions about the identities
being defended. This distinction is cumbersome, given the extant correlations between socioeconomic status and attributes considered anatomical
or quasi-anatomical. For example, poverty serves as both a reference point
for social class and as a product of systemic racism, and the persistent
wage gap between men and women remains at the intersection of economics and sexism. Isolating anatomical traits also complicates the location of
one's immigration status as a unifying theme, because many undocumented migrant workers are also poor and racialized, leaving them vulnerable to specific kinds of exploitation that become determinants of their
socio-economic standing. Their plight also informs part of Trump's narrative that illegal immigration undercuts wages for American workers, which
lies at the center of his proposal for interrupting remittance flows to
Mexico.
Race consists of both physical and cultural constructs with complex
etiologies, and, as George Lipsitz observed, "conscious and deliberate
actions have institutionalized group identity in the United States, not just
through the dissemination of cultural stories, but also through systematic
efforts from colonial times to the present to create economic advantages
through a possessive investment in whiteness... ."30 This framing of white
identity is also useful in describing the allocation of relative advantages
among the poor, consistent with Lyndon Johnson's famous quote: "If you
can convince the lowest white man he's better than the best colored man,
he won't notice you're picking his pocket. Hell, give him somebody to look
down on, and he'll empty his pockets for you. '"8 1 Johnson's politically
shrewd statement resonates today and lies at the heart of the political
calculus informing Trump's proposal. The expanding presence of nonwhite immigrants and the gradual "browning" of American society are
occurring at that very moment when America's white working-class men
are not keeping pace with income earners in other demographic groups,
and who are now struggling with the collective realization that there may
be fewer people "to look down on." Once understood in racial terms, the
politicization of remittances attempts to causally connect remittance users
to the erosion of benefits derived from whiteness as a rapidly devaluing
form of cultural and economic currency. Perhaps most striking is the
rapidity with which racial invectives have become more explicit departures
79. For a discussion of neo-Marxist treatments of intersections between class and
status identities see Bernstein, supra note 76, at 49.

80. GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS: How WHITE PEOPLE
PROFIT FROM IDENTITY POLITIcS 2 (2006).
81. Bill D. Moyers, What a Real President Was Like, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 1988),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1988/11/13/what-a-real-president[https://
was-like/d483c1be-d0da-43b7-bde6-04e10106ff6c/?utmterm=.Ob3eOf5bb5d6
perma.cc/B5CW-LK97]. While Johnson was referring to African-Americans when referring to the "colored man," his comments remain relevant vis-a-vis relationships between
people of color and white Americans.
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from the relatively coded lexicon, which grew out of the so-called "Southern Strategy." Lee Atwater's infamous quote neatly captures the theory of
this evolution:
You start out in 1954 by saying, "Nigger, nigger, nigger." By 1968 you
can't say "nigger"-that hurts you, backfires. So you say stuff like, uh, forced
busing, states' rights, and all that stuff, and you're getting so abstract. Now,
you're talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you're talking about
are totally economic things and a byproduct [sic] of them is, blacks get hurt
worse than whites .... "We want to cut this," is much more abstract than
even the
busing thing, uh, and a hell of a lot more abstract than "Nigger,
82
nigger.
The legacy of this evolution would manifest itself in ostensibly race-neutral
presidential campaign strategies, many of which were intended to have lasting economic effects on African-Americans. For example, reactions to passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, popularized phrases like "law and
order" (in response to race riots that periodically broke out in cities across
the country) and "freedom of choice" (in response to school desegregation), which helped to engineer the gradual departure of white conservatives from the Democratic party.8 3 The references to welfare dependency
among minorities are particularly germane to this Article, which recognizes as a fact the enduring stereotypical assumptions of African-Americans and other minorities as being overly dependent on various forms of
government assistance-such as food stamp use-as a reflection of their
poor work ethic, disrespect for individualism, and the inability to maintain
supportive family structures. During a 1976 campaign rally, Reagan told
listeners about Linda Taylor, an African-American woman in Chicago facing charges for welfare fraud. According to Reagan this "welfare queen," as
the Chicago Tribune had named her, used "80 names, thirty addresses,
fifteen telephone numbers to collect food stamps, Social Security, veterans'
benefits for four nonexistent deceased veteran husbands, as well as welfare.
84
Her tax-free cash income alone has been running $150,000 a year."
Politicizing examples of welfare fraud dovetailed with a neoconservative
82. Rick Perlstein, Exclusive: Lee Atwater's Infamous 1981 Interview on the Southern
Strategy, THE NATION, (Nov. 13, 2012), https://www.thenation.com/article/exclusivelee-atwaters-infamous-1981-interview-southern-strategy/.
83. For a concise summary of this history, see Leland Ware & David C. Wilson, Jim
Crow On The "Down Low": Subtle Racial Appeals In PresidentialCampaigns, 24 ST. JOHN'S
J. LEGAL COMMENT. 299, 309-10 (2009).
84. Josh Levin, The Welfare Queen, SLATE (DEC. 19, 2013 12:41AM), http://www.slate
.com/articles/news-and politics/history/2013/12/linda-taylor -welfare-queen ronald_

reaganmade her a notoriousamerican_villain.html [https://perma.cc/NA34-642]. It
is ironic that such racially coded welfare narratives not only entered the payment land-

scape, but helped Reagan win the election, only to embark on a program to dismantle
the very trade unions that shored up white working-class identity in America. Reagan
put his willingness to confront organized labor on full display less than seven months
into his first term. On August 3, 1981, roughly 13,000 the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) went on strike. Georgette Miller et al., The 1981 Strike of
the Air Traffic Controllers in the United States, 7 AIR L. 215, 215 (1982). Through the
Federal Aviation Administration, Reagan moved to terminate more than 11,000 workers
who ignored his demands to return to work. Id. For an interesting discussion of this

2017

A Complicated Alchemy

agenda that rejected identity-based politics originating from the civil rights,
feminist, and anti-war movements (among others). As Anthony Cook
argues, this agenda "advocated supply-side, free trade, and deregulatory
policies over demand-side, fair trade, and regulatory approaches to the
economy. It implemented statist over individual-liberty approaches to
national security and demanded the prioritization of military over social
welfare spending, even if unprecedented federal deficits resulted."8 5 Here I
must acknowledge the characterization of globalization as the politicized
rationale for the labor movement's demise rather than the predominant
cause. This is consistent with the findings of the Center for Economic Policy and Research, which noted that the unionized proportion of American
workers reached thirty percent at its apex in the 1960s.8 6 The next fifty
years would see this figure fall to twelve percent-last place among the
world's top twenty-one developed countries.8 7 Whether viewed as the
direct cause of the labor movement's demise or a by-product of neoliberalism's embrace of it, globalization's impact remains relevant in considering
corporatist motivations for outsourcing millions of American jobs from the
1980s onward.
The effects of this shift have been felt in unionized and non-unionized
workplaces alike. A statistical analysis of American wages recently published by the Economic Policy Institute found an association between deunionization and wage suppression among non-unionized, private sector
workers without college degrees. 88 The report estimates that male salaries
would be $3000 higher per year had unions remained as strong in 2013 as
they were in the late 1970s. 8 9 The differential was relatively modest for
women-$676 per year. 90 Significantly, these figures do not expressly control for regional variations in deunionization, with Midwestern states
experiencing the most dramatic declines in owing to their contracted
industrial economic bases. 9 1 Nor do they expressly isolate for race to
determine racial disparities in their calculations. The scope of unionization's influence on non-unionized workplaces should not be limited to
wages. Its history of systematic and deliberate racial exclusion in the development of white working class identity served as a functional complement
to the explicit racism and, eventually, the racial coding that defined modstrike's antecedents and effects on the AFL's influence, see the Georgette Miller article
cited within this footnote.
85. Anthony Cook, The Ghosts Of 1964: Race, Reagan, And The Neo-Conservative
Backlash To The Civil Rights Movement, 6 ALA.C.R. & C.L. L. REv. 81, 110 (2015).
86. John Schmitt & Alexandra Mitukiewicz, Politics Matter: Changes in Unionization
Rates in Rich Countries, 1960-2010, CTR. ECON. POL'Y & REs., 1, 2-5 (2011).
87. Id. at 2, 4-5.
88. Jake Rosenfeld et al., Union Decline Lowers Wages of Nonunion Workers, ECON.
POL'Y INST., 12-13 (2016).
89. Id.
90. Id.
50
91. For data capturing regional deunionization rates, see Barry Hirsch et al.,
Years Of Shrinking Union Membership, In One Map, PLANET MONEY (Feb. 23, 2015), http:/
/www.npr.org/sections/money/2015/02/23/385843576/50-years-of-shrinking-unionmembership-in-one-map [https://perma.cc/56SR-BBX9].
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ern American politics. Organized labor's severance from social justice
movements would eventually support neoliberalism's arrival at the workshop floor, with dire consequences for the vary workers who were convinced they would benefit from business unionism indefinitely.
IV.

Locating Migrant Remittances Within Payment System Taxonomy

While much has been written about the significance of consumer
purchasing choices, myriad social meanings also attend how we pay for
things. For example, the respective social treatments of being poor versus
relying on food stamps are reflected in wider perceptions of poverty as
opposed to social welfare dependency. These perceptions also converge
with attitudes towards racial minorities and immigrants as well as stereotypical assumptions about the kinds of payment practices most common
among these populations. Assumptions that African-Americans, Latinos,
and immigrants are more likely to be welfare dependents connotes views
about the use of payment practices supporting access to such dependency,
with the result that a negative social coding now surrounds remittance
usage, aided by apprehensions about national security, the state of the U.S.
economy, and the presence of undocumented immigrants inside America's
borders. In the remittance context, this evolution has been underway for at
least the last fifteen years. Themes flowing through remittance scholarship
since 9/11 reflect a set of societal anxieties about these transactional
spaces, and the actors within them relegate these particular payment practices to a position of ignobility among other payment typologies. These
typologies lay along a continuum with more respectable, mainstream debit
and credit card usage at one end and migrant remittances practices at the
other. However, the existence of all these pathways to accessing payment
processing supports the notion that processes by which people receive or
make payments are vital to both domestic and international economic participation. Checks, money orders, and other payment instruments are of
diminished monetary value without facilities to support their negotiability.
Similarly, access to international wire transfer services is of critical importance to migrants and their receiving country economies insofar as the
infrastructure supporting this capital mobility also supports migrant
mobility.
Conventional retail banking occupies the most desirable position
along the payment continuum, with nearly seventy percent of all American
households being fully banked. 92 According to the FDIC, the proportion
93
of unbanked households was 7.7% (or 9.6 million households) in 2013.
92. This Article defines a "bank" as a depository institution that is (i) insured by the
FDIC; and (ii) chartered and examined by either a federal or state bank regulatory
agency.
93.

FDIC, NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 4 (2013).

"Unbanked" households are those in which nobody has a checking or savings account at
an insured financial institution. "Underbanked" households have checking or savings
accounts but use alternative financial services. The FDIC classifies the latter as
underbanked if they use "non-bank money orders, non-bank check-cashing services,
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During the same period, the number of underbanked households reached
twenty percent (or 24.8 million). 9 4 Fully banked households can meet the
requirements for opening a checking or savings account and, in the case of
the former, maintaining a minimum balance to avoid monthly fees. The
result is access to lower transactional costs associated with cashing checks
and using debit or credit cards. Consumers who cannot meet the requirements for opening a checking account must resort to check-cashing businesses, which charge a fee for each check cashed. Here, I briefly focus on
check-cashing services because federal regulation imposes a system of hold
periods on checks, effectively deterring retail bank usage among lower95
income consumers who cannot afford to wait for access to their funds.
This corrals poorer consumers (those lower along the desirability continuum) towards check-cashers who provide services to those who cannot
access retail banking. Similar considerations revolve around affordable
access to credit, because consumers with relationships to retail banks are
able to obtain loans whereas their less-creditworthy counterparts often
resort to so-called payday loans. Despite the ethical misgivings that might
surround seemingly predatory fee structures within alternative financial
service providers, Michael Barr observes some endogenous challenges:
These are paper- and labor-intensive transactions involving small dollar amounts, conducted on behalf of consumers with low wealth and often
uncertain or poor credit history. These transactions are undertaken
largely by financial service providers, which, unlike insured depositories,
lack direct access to the payments system for check clearance. Moreover,
the fixed costs of lending show up in higher prices for loans of short dura96
tion and small amounts.
Further along the continuum sit those payment instruments supporting social welfare programs-such as Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT)
schemes-associated with those considered flawed inasmuch as a stigma
persists around food stamp dependency. EBT cards are the latest iteration
of a federally funded program that began under the Lyndon Johnson
administration with passage of the Food Stamp Act of 1964. 97 EBT cards
are technologically configured to control beneficiary purchasing choices,
curtailing transactional autonomy in the process. As instruments of digital
surveillance, these cards are the modern reincarnation of home inspectors
and other virtue testing schemes imposed on the poor as a precondition of
non-bank remittances, payday loans, rent-to-own services, pawn shop loans, refund
anticipation loans, or auto title loans at least once in the [twelve months preceding its
periodic surveys]. See Glossary, FDIC (last visited Oct. 8, 2016), https://www
.economicinclusion.gov/glossary.html [https://perma.cc/2Q5N-3NGU ]. In passing, it
is noteworthy to observe that affluent immigrants forced to rely on alternative financial
services to remit funds to their home countries are deemed underbanked, without
regard for the lack of correspondent banking options in receiving countries that might
support bank-to-bank wire transfers. See id.
94. FDIC, supra note 93.
95. 12 C.F.R. § 229.12 et seq.
96. Michael Barr, Banking on the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 124 (2004).
97. Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, 78 Stat. 703 (codified as amended
at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2036(a) (2012)).
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welfare eligibility. This scrutiny is not a cost-saving measure and accounts
for the largest portion of America's federal food stamp budget. In 1990 the
average food stamp beneficiary's monthly allocation was $58.78 (or
$104.82 adjusted for inflation to the year 2013). By 2013 the monthly
allocation rose to $113.07 per person. During the same period overall program costs ballooned from $14.1 billion in 1990 to $76.1 billion in 2013,
with no commensurate increase in beneficiary enrollment. 98 These
increases reflect the technological costs associated with regulating end
users. Although the program could save money by doubling individual
payments as checks or direct deposit, the more expensive status quo
remains politic and consonant with persistent stereotypes about so-called
"welfare queens" and other connotations used to culturally demean those
who are dependent on welfare.
So, why do migrant remittances occupy the last position on the continuum? The answer is both cultural and political insofar as remittances cater
to "the other," by which I mean those whose financial needs bind them to
other cultures, other societies, and other practices considered outside normative modem payment conventions most Americans observe. People
who collectively constitute "the other" are more likely to be people of color,
given the ethnic composition of migrant producing countries. The data
confirms their growing presence in developed economies where job opportunities and wages are relatively good when compared to the limited
options available in remittance dependent economies. Remittances are
somehow connected to the very things that make many Americans fearful:
economic decline, insecurities made more complex by the end of the Cold
War and seemingly atomized dispersal of risk lurking around every comer.
This construction of remittances is the predictable result of their politicization, and may transform them into toxic points of convergence where friction persists between immigrants and sending country citizens. Clients
using migrant remittances represent an emerging "class of deplorables"
within modem payment hierarchy precisely because they operate in transactional spaces where they become a collective touchstone for expressing
Americans' anxiety about their country's place in the new economy, while
making them nostalgic for an unlikely return to protectionism.
A taxonomical approach offers a useful way to understand relationships between remittance customers and their working class detractors,
many of whom have cascaded from one end of the payment continuum
towards the other because of their economic misfortunes. Those who bear
the brunt of globalism are likely to perceive themselves as being within
economic proximity to those very migrants considered agents of unwanted
change and with whom they see themselves in direct conflict. This perceived proximity animates fears that legitimize xenophobic isolationism in
a world order where reversion to trade protectionism is unlikely, and where
98. Wilks, supra note 3, at 332; see also Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
Participationand Costs, U.S.D.A. FNS (last updated June 7, 2017), http://www.fns.usda
.gov/pd/SNAPsummary.htm [https://perma.cc/K96A-YBHN].
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the implied benefits long associated with whiteness can no longer be taken
for granted.
Conclusion
Using law to conscript financial technology in aid of state goals is not
new. Financial institutions have long been subject to myriad legal and regulatory reporting requirements designed to combat money laundering,
enforce economic sanctions, support tax compliance, and interdict the
financing of terrorism. Trump's particular approach to this tradition, however, seeks to capitalize on a particularly toxic convergence of race, class,
economics, and globalization. America is not alone in its recent experience
with surges in right wing, nationalist populism. Globalism's winds have
posed challenges to those who have enjoyed the benefits of protectionist
trade policies that no longer exist, placing them on a collision course with
diaspora migrants from the poorest countries who are now mobile, thanks
to financial technologies that ease the process of remitting funds home.
This collision is a complicated alchemy, which lays bare the ways in which
populist faith in the free market appears to be eroding under the strain of
globalization's effects.
In politicizing migrant remittance flows to Mexico, Donald Trump has
signaled both a political recognition of this erosion and a willingness to
exploit it. In doing so, he has done more than simply peddle a narrative
that appeals to a base of voters increasingly dissatisfied with America's
political class. He has likely prompted a new set of considerations among
diaspora communities anxious to preserve existing remittance flows in the
face of intense anxiety about America's working poor.9 9 Yet this conflict
demonstrates how modem payment platforms now serve a range of functions one might have seen in a medieval town square: they facilitate commerce while serving as points of conflict and as places of protest. Every
possible kind of human and institutional actor passes through this square,
shaping its form and function, whether deliberately or unwittingly. The
respective aspirations of globalism's human casualties are a deeply complex ecology-reflecting a range of outlooks in relation to one another.
On the heels of a presidential campaign defined by explicitly divisive
rhetoric transcending the traditional limits of dog-whistle politics, dismissive attitudes towards Trump's campaign proposal have crystalized into palpable fears among progressives who now worry about the potential of
witnessing the deployment of proposals that once seemed unlikely.
Whether or not President Trump ultimately expands federal regulations to
require proof of lawful presence in the country as a precondition of access
to international remittance services may matter less than the consequences
of linking these transactions to undocumented immigrants in the minds of
the white working class.
99. "Diaspora" is a more functional label for the portion of the analysis, encapsulating the broader spectrum of remittance users, including undocumented workers and
those who are lawfully present in the United States.

